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1 Introduction
Balancing electricity demand and supply is difficult and expensive. Traditionally system
operators have used supply-side techniques, such as reserves, to make sure that there is
always enough generation to meet a fairly inelastic demand as demand fluctuates.1Short-
term demand is inelastic in part because retail prices have historically been fixed for long
periods of time.
Recently there has been an increasing focus on the use of demand-side tools to improve
balancing markets. Encouraging demand to react more to electricity prices has three
advantages. First of all, higher prices are typically associated with higher demand.2In the
short term, limiting peak demand decreases generation at times when it is most costly,
thereby decreasing costs more than proportionally to the decrease in demand. In addition,
peaking plants tend to run on fossil fuels and be less efficient, causing greater greenhouse
gas emissions per unit of electricity generated. Additionally, if peak demand decreases
there is need for fewer investments in electricity generation, transmission and distribution
in the medium to long term, leading to savings for the system as a whole. Finally, all
EU countries must reduce emissions and energy consumption by 2020 to comply with EU
energy efficiency targets (2009/28/EC).3Reducing peak electricity demand also helps meet
this target.
In this paper we examine if changes in the way electricity is priced have an effect on
peak consumption, if any decrease in peak consumption is simply shifted to off-peak hours,
and if the way electricity prices are communicated is important in achieving changes in
consumption. In particular, we use data from a smart metering trial that took place
in Ireland. In 2007, the Irish Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) announced a
trial smart metering experiment in the Irish residential electricity market in an effort
to investigate the benefits of Time-of-Use (TOU) pricing of residential electricity and
estimate the role that clear and accessible price charged might play in facilitating consumer
behaviour change. This Consumer Behavioural Trial (CBT) employed TOU tariffs in
1See for Ireland EIRGRID (2009).
2On average, peak load for the Irish system is about 25% greater than the average day demand
3Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2009) on the promotion of the
use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing directives 2001/77/EC
and 2003/30/EC, Official Journal of the European Union.
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combination with other demand side stimuli (bi-monthly and monthly billing and in-home
displays which show constantly the electricity consumption installed at home) in an effort
to reduce peak demand and overall electricity use in the residential sector. This residential
CBT is one of the largest smart metering behavioural trials conducted internationally
to date and thus provides a wealth of information on the impact of smart metering on
electricity consumers (CER/11/080a).
The Irish smart meter trial follows other similar experiments run in the US (see Faruqui
and Sergici (2010)) and in Europe (see Aubin et al. (1995) and Filippini (1995)). These
experiments investigate whether consumption reacts more to prices when the cost of elec-
tricity follows wholesale costs more closely. In particular, this implies higher electricity
prices during peak demand periods. As highlighted by Faruqui et al. (2010), in the US
some experiments have been undertaken in order to assess the impact of dynamic pricing
on the electricity consumption. The studies confirm that higher prices during congested
hours lead to a slight change in the electricity consumption, and that the magnitude of
the effect is not constant across the experiments. In some cases, the results show that con-
sumers do not significantly change consumption as prices change. One explanation is that
consumers have bounded capacity and do not fully reassess their optimal consumption
when the price of electricity increases. Another possible explanation that may be consid-
ered is that the opportunity cost of changing behaviour is too high for the consumers (i.e.
the time spent monitoring prices constantly is not used for other productive activities).
A wide empirical literature has shown that changes in prices are not sufficient to reduce
electricity use significantly Allcott (2011); Jessoe (2013); Di Cosmo et al. (2014). For
instance, Gabaix (2006) found that consumers often exhibit uncertainty on the relationship
between inputs and outputs, such as how heating a room translates into energy usage or
how a use of the washing machine translates into cost. Providing additional information
on electricity use and price may help to resolve consumer uncertainty and potentially
significantly improve conservation.
Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) suggest that the decision of how much electricity to
use is a classic intertemporal choice: electricity and its benefits are immediate, whereas
the cost of electricity use is delayed to the time consumers receive their bill. The decision
on when and how much electricity to consume is difficult because consumers value future
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benefits and costs less than current ones, in fact much less. Moreover, Johnson and Bickel
(2002) finds that the costs per decision, such as those typical in electricity consumption
choices, give rise to more extreme discounting. Consumers are therefore resistant to change
their electricity usage patterns.
Another strategy the consumers may adopt is the shift of loads from peak to night
hours. TOU electricity pricing reflects the higher cost of supply during peak hours and
lower cost off-peak hours. Although TOU pricing does not reflect changes in wholesale
prices as accurately as real-time pricing (i.e. following the wholesale price completely) it
has possible advantages, because it is easy to understand and predictable, as shown by
Faruqui et al. (2010). Mountain and Lawson (1995) analysed Canadian responsiveness to
residential TOU rates. Examining the response both in peak and in the boundary hours
to the price event, the authors identify the rate structures that give the best response in
terms of the reduction of consumption during peak hours. Moreover, the authors look at
the hours close to the peak hours and find that there are no potential problems regarding
new peak creation. However, many studies have found evidence of load shifting (associated
with TOU pricing). Faruqui et al. (2010) provide an example of a TOU tariff in the UK,
“Economy 7”, where customers take advantage of lower night time tariffs by shifting their
electricity usage to night-time storage heaters and water heaters on a timer. Faruqui and
Sergici (2010) analyse 15 pricing experiments using TOU pricing and find that customers
respond to higher prices during the peak hours by reducing peak hour electricity usage
and/or shifting it to less expensive off-peak periods. On average, TOU rates induce a
reduction in peak demand from 3-6% in the 15 pricing experiments.
How much consumers value the future versus the present may vary with income and
education. Typically, the better educated and higher earners value the future more than
less educated and poorer consumers.4 If, in line with such research, lower socio-economic
(SES) groups find it more difficult to change usage in response to TOU pricing, they would
end up paying a larger share of electricity costs and effectively subsidising the consumption
of higher SES groups. Since individuals with lower income and less education also have
fewer financial resources, these higher costs constitute a large relative economic burden
and might increase fuel poverty as shown by Scott et al. (2008).
4See Green et al. (1996); Reimers et al. (2009)
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Our results show that the information on the tariff applied gives consumers incentives
to reduce their electricity use. The consumers provided with an in-house display, which
clearly communicated changes in electricity price, tend to decrease consumption during
peak periods more than other consumers and to keep consumption low for some time after
the end of peak pricing.
Our work finds that educated people use the information associated to the TOU tariffs
slightly better than the average, reducing their consumption more during high tariffs in
the peak hours.
This paper continues by describing our data used from the consumer behavioural trial
in Section 2. Section 3 describes the methodology used, section 4 presents the results of
our analysis and section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The CBT replaced existing mechanical meter readers with smart meters in approximately
5,000 households. The residential component of the trial involved all these households
(customers of Electric Ireland ) who were asked to participate in the trial.5 While par-
ticipating households self-selected into the trial, and therefore the results cannot be gen-
eralised to the overall population, participants were randomly assigned to control and
treatment groups. Data were collected over the period 14 July 2009 to 31 December
2010, and as the experiment began on 1 January 2010, six months of pre-trial data are
available for both the control and treatment groups. The control group was billed on
their normal tariff and saw no changes to their bill. They received none of the informa-
tion stimuli and were requested to continue using their electricity as normal (Commission
for Energy Regulation, 2011a). Benchmark pre-trial data is available for all households
(both control and treatment) for the period 14 July 2009-31 December 2009. Treatment
groups were exposed to a variety of TOU tariffs and information stimuli (IHD, bi-monthly
and monthly billing).6More precisely, four TOU tariffs were tested. TOU prices referred
to peak (17:00-18:59 Monday-Friday, excluding public holidays), day (08:00-16:59; 19:00-
5At the time of recruitment (mid-2008), Electric Ireland customers represented 100 per cent of residential
electricity customers in Ireland (CER (2011).
6A description of IHD can be found here: http://www.cer.ie/docs/000117/
cer13164-presentation-of-energy-usage-information.pdf, pg.101.
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22:59 Monday-Friday, plus 17:00-18:59 public holidays, Saturday and Sunday) and night
(23:00-07:59) periods (based on system demand peaks). A weekend tariff was also tested
(whereby the night rate applied all day Saturday and Sunday, with separate peak, day and
night tariffs for weekdays). In comparison with the initial flat-rate tariff, the electricity
price associated with peak hour consumption rose up to a maximum of 166 per cent of
its initial value, while the price of electricity during the day and night was decreased by
a maximum of 13 per cent and 37 per cent respectively. The TOU tariffs were designed
to be neutral in comparison with the standard flat-rate tariff to ensure that the average
participant who did not change their electricity consumption would not be financially
penalised.
Table 1: Control and treatment period tariffs (€/cents per kWh, including VAT)
Tariff Pre-TreatmentPeriod Post-Treatment Period % change
Peak, Day and Night Peak Day Night Peak Day Night
Control 16.24 16 16 16 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5
Tariff A 16.24 22.7 15.89 13.62 39.8 -2.2 -16.1
Tariff B 16.24 29.51 15.32 12.46 81.7 -5.6 -23.1
Tariff C 16.24 36.32 14.76 11.35 123.7 -9.1 -30.1
Tariff D 16.24 43.13 14.19 10.22 165.6 -12.6 -37.1
Tariff W/E 16.24 33.03 14.45 11.35 103.4 -11 -30.1
Data surce: CER (2011)
3 Methodology
Statistics calculated by CER (2011) using the data from the trial, show that smart me-
tering in combination with bimonthly billing and energy usage statement affect electricity
consumption with a decrease in peak period consumption of 11.3%. From these initial
findings it’s not clear if there was new peak formation in energy use as a result of the
predicted price change. In general TOU tariffs and two of the Demand-Side Management
stimuli (monthly billing and IHD installed) were found to reduce overall electricity us-
age by 2.5% and peak usage by 8.8%. The statistical analysis, however, don’t assess the
causal relation between the change in tariff and the electricity consumption. Moreover,
it does not take into account the other variables (like weather and appliances installed
in the house) that potentially affect the consumer’s behaviour. We use half-hourly data
to investigate which are the determinants of the behaviour of the consumers both during
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the peak and the boundary hours, close to the change in the tariff. In order to estimate
the changes in electricity consumption before and after the trial we use the difference in
difference estimator. As shown by Di Cosmo et al. (2014) and CER (2011), the only differ-
ence between the households who populate our sample is the treatment. We divided the
sample into three different subsamples, following the three stimuli. Then, for each group,
we compare the mean of consumers in the pre-treatment and treatment period and the
mean of consumers in the control and treatment group, controlling for everything else that
has the potential to affect the behaviour of consumers during time. This can be done by
using the random effects estimator for panel data. It’s important to highlight that in our
sample there are no tariff differences for consumers in the control group. As the CBT trial
was set up as a randomized experiment, people in the control group statistically have the
same characteristics of the consumers in the other group, but they were not subject to a
change in tariff. Moreover, people in the control group were not informed about the change
between the ”control” and the ”treatment” period. As people in the control group were
facing the same price during the whole period (control plus trial) for them the diff-in-diff
effect of a change in tariff is zero. We include them in our analysis in order to capture
symmetric and exogenous shocks that may have happened but that are not under control
and are not captured by the regressors included in Eq. 1 below. All models are estimated
using STATA 13, and standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level.
qits = α1TarA,t + α2TarB,t + α3TarC,t + α4TarD,t + α5TarW,t
+β1TarA ∗Groupi + β2TarB ∗Groupi + β3TarC ∗Groupi + β4TarD ∗Groupi
+β5TarW,i ∗Groupi + Treatp + Controls
(1)
in which qits is the half hourly consumption of electricity by household i under stimulus
s observed at the half-hour t. We also include here consumers who were in the control
group during the treatment period, to take into account consumers under stimulus s but
not subject to tariff’s change. Tarz,t is the dummy variable indicating that the household
was exposed to tariff z (z = A,B,C,D) during the treatment period. TarW,t is the
dummy variable indicating that the household was exposed to the weekend tariff during the
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treatment period. The coefficients therefore represent our difference-in-difference estimates
(i.e., the effect of the various TOU tariffs on household electricity consumption). Tarz ∗
Groupi is the time-invariant dummy variable indicating that the household is a member
of the Tariff z treatment group. These variables should not be significant at the statistical
level, as by construction the consumers were distributed randomly across the groups.
Treatp is the dummy variable indicating the treatment period. This variable indicates the
differences between the control and the treatment period in terms of electricity consumed.
We expect that during the trial the consumers reduce their electricity consumption as
they become more aware of their usage, so we expect a negative and significant sign for
the Treatp coefficient.
Controls is an additional variable, which includes a dummy variable for public holidays
and a set of dummies for each day of the week. We also include a variable that reflects the
heating degree days, sunshine is a variable that reflects sunshine hours (not included in the
night specification), a count variable of the number of appliances owned by the household
and a dummy variable indicating that the household has an electric heating system. We
also include in our specification a variable that interacts the heating degree days with the
dummy for electric heating; this variable should control for high electricity consumption
during the winter of 2010, in which the temperatures in Ireland were exceptionally low, as
well as the differential response to TOU tariffs among households with different heating
types.
Finally, on the 20th of July 2010 and on the 6th of December 2010 due to technical
problems smart meters stop registering the electricity consumption of a subsample of
80 households. In order to assess the impact of this technical problem we run different
robustness checks: first we run the regressions interpolating consumption between the 19th
and the 21st of July and the 5th and 7th of December respectively; second we drop those
days from our sample and, finally, we drop those days only from the subsample of affected
consumers. The results in all of the cases didn’t vary significantly from each other.7
7Complete results are available from the authors upon request.
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4 Results
4.1 Peak
Table 2 and Figure 1 below show the results of the consumer’s reaction to the change
in tariffs and stimuli during the trial. As highlighted by Di Cosmo et al. (2014) during
the peak hours (from 5PM to 7PM), consumers across all three stimuli (bi-monthly bill,
monthly bill and IHD) significantly modify their behaviour during the treatment period,
reducing their consumption with respect to the control period. However, Di Cosmo et al.
(2014) do not investigate the effects of a tariff change on half-hourly basis. This is partic-
ularly important for two reasons. First, to check whether the consumers react constantly
during the hours affected by the change in tariff. It’s important to assess the consumer’s
reaction on half-hourly basis in order to establish whether the price signal is perceived cor-
rectly in all the four half-hours affected by the tariff change, or if changes in the behaviour
occur after the first half-hour. Second, our analysis allows us to assess whether during the
boundary half-hours (i.e. the half-hours which immediately precede or follow the change
in tariff) there are changes in electricity consumption. This is important because loads
may be shifted easily from the peak hours to the period immediately after, generating a
new demand peak which potentially undermines the results achieved by the tariff increase
during the peak hours.
The following Figure shows the estimated coefficients by stimuli and tariffs applied.
The full results are reported in Table 1 in the next page, in which significant coefficients
(at 1% level) are reported in bold face. In the Figure below the coefficients which are
statistically significant are represented by full dots. The coefficients which are statisti-
cally significant measure the difference in the consumer’s electricity consumption between
the control and the treatment period. For example, the first column of Figure 1 shows
the estimated coefficient for consumers with bi-monthly bills. The coefficients related to
the tariff dummies reflect the change in electricity consumption for all the people with
bi-monthly billing after the increase in the peak tariffs between the control and the treat-
ment periods. The first line represents consumers under tariff A; the fourth line represents
consumers under tariff D. By comparing these two lines it is possible to notice that con-
sumers under tariff D reduce their electricity consumption more than consumers facing
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the same stimulus (i.e. bi-monthly bill) but a lower tariff. The third column of the Figure
shows people with IHD installed in their house. Again it is possible to see that all the
coefficients estimated for this group of consumers are statistically different from zero and
consumers associated with tariff D are reacting more than consumers under tariff A. In
particular, comparing the three columns of Figure 1 shows that people with IHD installed
in their home are more likely to change their consumption after the introduction of the
TOU tariffs than consumers facing other stimuli. 8
Figure 1: Whole sample results, peak
Looking at the half hourly data allows us to draw some interesting conclusions. Figure
1 above shows that the more responsive people also keep their consumption lower than
during the control period at 730PM, which is after the end of the peak tariff. As the peak
is defined as the period between 5PM and 7PM, the contraction of consumption at 7.30PM
may be seen as an over reaction to the applied tariff. This result is particularly important
in order to understand the impact of the tariff change on the boundary hours close to the
peak time. After the increase in the peak tariffs, consumers may shift their consumption
to the hours immediately before (or after) the hours affected by the price change. In this
case, a new peak will be created and the benefit of TOU tariffs will be partially lost. Our
results show that people with monthly bill and IHD will still perceive the change of the
peak tariff until 7.30PM, which is half-hour later the tariff change. These consumers will
be less keen to postpone their consumption immediately after 7PM. At the same time,
as examined in the next session, there is no evidence of consumption shift from peak to
8Also this result is coherent with the findings by Di Cosmo et al. (2014).
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night hours for the participants in the trial. As a result, the application of TOU tariffs
associated with either monthly billing or the IHD stimulus may lead the consumers to
keep contracting electricity consumption with respect to the control period after the end
of the peak tariff. However, our results show that there is no evidence of load shift (with
a new peak creation) to hours close to the peak hours.
Analyzing the patterns by the stimuli provided, in the IHD group the relationship
between the costs of the TOU tariff and observed reductions was not as strong as for the
people in the monthly-bill group. In particular, comparing people facing the highest tariff
(tariff D) in these two groups lead to some interesting conclusions. As shown also by
Table 2, in all the half-hours people with the highest tariff and monthly-bill reduce their
consumption more than people facing the same tariff but with IHD installed. There are
two straightforward reasons why this might have occurred. First, IHD feedback (given in
€KW/hour) might have reduced behaviour of consumers on the most punitive tariff to
such a degree that it reached a floor of electricity reduction, a local minimum due to the
limited elasticity of electricity demand. Such a possibility seems the most parsimonious
explanation of the observed consumption patterns and is supported by the fact that con-
sumption of consumers on Tariff A who received IHD had reductions similar to the lowest
reductions observed in the study. A second possibility concerns the information provided
by the IHD when compared to that provided by monthly billing. For a small enough
unit of time (e.g., 1 minute), there is very little difference between the cost of electricity
across tariffs, so households might not have been sensitive to these small differences as
they were observed in small rolling increments. Conversely, with monthly billing, differ-
ences in the cost of peak electricity would have been bigger and more clearly observable.
Billing at a delay of one month exhibited a clear relationship between cost magnitude and
consumption reduction. 9
9Data during control period have been collected from July to December 2009. As a result, the first 7
months of the trial period (January-July 2010) do not have the corresponding control period observations.
Therefore, we are not able to check the coefficients for consumers with monthly bills for the first month of
the trial and check whether they started to respond immediately or with a monthly lag.
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Table 2: Estimation Results - peak hours, (KWh/day)
Hour Stimulus A B C D Treat
Period
Treat
Group
Weekday
Dumm.
Bank
Holiday
Sunsh Appl. Electric
Heat-
ing
17-
1730
Bimonthly -0.045 -0.060 -0.022 -0.041 S(-) NS S NS S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.018 -0.058 -0.049 -0.075 S(-) NS S NS S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.058 -0.037 -0.037 -0.064 S(-) NS S NS S(-) S(+) S(+)
1730-
18
Bimonthly -0.059 -0.069 -0.035 -0.058 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.039 -0.06 -0.063 -0.097 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.077 -0.082 -0.066 -0.071 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
18-
1830
Bimonthly -0.048 -0.073 -0.033 -0.073 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.046 -0.067 -0.072 -0.113 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.074 -0.062 -0.077 -0.094 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
1830-
19
Bimonthly -0.036 -0.081 -0.029 -0.077 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.054 -0.079 -0.072 -0.108 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.073 -0.053 -0.072 -0.107 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
19-
1930
Bimonthly -0.006 -0.041 -0.004 -0.02 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.026 -0.0384 -0.032 -0.029 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.039 -0.039 -0.024 -0.047 S(-) NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Significant coefficients are in bold (at 1% and 5% level). NS=not significant (at 5% level), S=significant, S(-) is significant and negative, S(+) is significant and positive
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4.2 Day and night
4.2.1 Day
The effects of TOU tariffs and financial feedback were in the main limited to peak hours.
During the majority of day time, there were no significant consumption changes. That
said, some changes in behaviour were observed the first part of the day, from 10 to 12 AM.
Consumers with monthly billing and IHD reduced consumption for certain tariffs relative
to baseline (see Table 3).
It is not clear why reductions were observed in the Monthly and IHD groups at this
time. One possibility is that home practices in the Monthly group that reduced usage
during the peak period were also employed outside of peak times. There is some evi-
dence to support this. First, coefficients throughout the day indicated reduced usage for
the Monthly group (though not always significantly so) relative to pre-intervention us-
age. Second, the dominant strategy for all groups was one of reduced usage rather than
displaced usage, and reduction practices may be employed consistently during the day if
there was sufficient over-usage during the pre-intervention phase. Finally, as evidenced in
the night-time hours, there was some evidence of displacement of usage in all three groups
- that is, consumers used more electricity during low cost night-time hours than during
the pre-intervention phase. This might have facilitated an all-day reduction strategy by
consumers in the Monthly group. That is, by shifting much of the high consumption ac-
tivities to the night-time period, consumers could more easily engage in a straightforward
reduction strategy during daytime hours.
Table 3: Average of significant coefficients, 10AM-12AM
Bimonthly Monthly IHD
A NS -0.02872 -0.04043
B NS -0.04527 NS
C NS -0.03257 NS
D NS -0.04456 NS
Complete results based on the half-hourly analysis are available upon request from the Authors. NS=not
significant at 5% level
During the other times of the day, however, people under all the three stimuli do not
react to change in tariffs. This result is aligned with the findings of Di Cosmo et al. (2014)
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which highlight that the tariffs applied during the day in the trial period are almost the
same as the tariffs applied during the control period as shown by Table 1.
4.2.2 Night
Night results are also aligned with the results by Di Cosmo et al. (2014), as consumers did
not consistently change their behaviour during night time. Sporadic significant increases
in usage were identified however in all three groups. As mentioned previously, it is possible
that some displacement of usage into low-cost night-time hours occurred. Displacement
can be difficult to capture however, since it is not synchronised across users. If displaced
usage was spread across the night-time intervals then this would be reflected in small non-
significant increases. In fact, the coefficients for the vast majority of intervals were positive
for all tariffs and feedback groups, indicating higher usage than during the pre-intervention
period. However, small increase in electricity consumption are significantly different from
zero before 1AM and after 7AM in the morning for some of the consumers in the trial,
which is consistent with the reduction of the tariff during night hours. However, there is
not a clear pattern through these results, as shown by Table 4.
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients, night selected hours
Bimonthly Monthly IHD
1130PM
A NS NS NS
B NS NS NS
C 0.040 NS 0.031
D NS NS NS
12PM
A NS NS NS
B NS NS NS
C 0.046 NS 0.033
D NS 0.064 NS
1230PM
A NS NS NS
B NS NS NS
C 0.045 NS NS
D NS 0.063 NS
1AM
A NS NS NS
B NS NS NS
C 0.038 NS NS
D NS NS NS
NS=not significant at the 5% level
4.3 Education
In order to check the robustness of our results we ran the same regression described in
the previous chapter controlling by education level achieved by the head of household, as
other variables such as income or occupational status were not available.10 Results are
shown by Table 6 below and summarized by the following Figure.
10See Di Cosmo et al. (2014).
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Figure 2: Higher Education sample results, peak
Results for day and night do not change significantly including the education dummy,
and are not reported here.11 However, peak results indicated that highly educated people
tend to react slightly stronger than the average sample to a change in tariffs.
This result is not homogeneous across the different tariffs. By comparing the coeffi-
cients of groups associated with bi-monthly billing (see Table 6 below and the previous
Table 2) it is possible to notice that educated people in this group do not change signif-
icantly their consumption with respect to the full sample. However, this result does not
hold for monthly-bill and IHD, as educated people reduce their electricity consumption
more than the average when they have these stimuli.
This has interesting policy implications, as our results highlight that highly educated
people with high information signals (monthly-bills or IHD) are able to respond to changes
in tariffs more than the sample average. First, the CBT trial was set up in such a way that
participants were fully compensated for losses associated to the change in tariffs. However,
if the policy makers are keen to introduce TOU tariffs they should be aware that educated
people are likely to save more money during peak hours than the average of the sample.
Second, as education may be considered a proxy for the income level, highly educated
people may consume more electricity than less educated people in non-essential activities.
Comparing the data on electricity consumption of the highly educated consumers with the
less educated, lead to interesting results: the average per-capita electricity consumption
during the whole period (control and treatment) is 1.66 KWh per hour for highly educated
11Complete results are available from the authors upon request.
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people and 1.50 KWh for less educated people. The same results for the treatment period
only are lower for both groups (1.61 KWh for highly and 1.46 for less) but highly educated
reduce their consumption more than the less educated during the trial. Looking at the
percentiles of the consumption distribution emerges that people in the highly educated
group consume more than the less educated.
Table 5: Percentiles of consumption, low and high education
Low Edu High Edu
1% 0.012 0.015
5% 0.048 0.052
10% 0.085 0.087
25% 0.187 0.192
50% 0.426 0.462
75% 0.97 1.102
90% 1.892 2.094
95% 2.556 2.781
99% 4.031 4.245
Thus, it is possible to assume that highly educated contract their electricity con-
sumption more than less educated because the electricity consumption is associated with
non-essential activities. Thanks to the information provided by monthly and IHD in-
stalled, it was possible for people in this group to monitor their consumption and reduce
it accordingly to the new tariffs.
Finally, the analysis performed on half-hourly basis highlights differences in behaviour
across peak hours that did not emerge from previous studies such as Di Cosmo et al. (2014).
In particular, Table 6 shows that highly educated people in the IHD group keep electricity
consumption low even after the end of the peak tariff at 7PM. This result confirms our
previous finding: information is crucial to give people the right signal, but some times
may be misinterpreted, leading to over-reaction. In order to understand whether this
over-reaction disappears after the first months of the trial or it is stable until the end
of the trial, we run the model just for the final months of the trial (from September
to December). Our results confirm that highly educated people with IHD installed at
home reduced their consumption after 7PM with respect to the control period, but in
December this effect weakens (it becomes statistically different from 0 at the 10% level).
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Unfortunately, we cannot predict how consumers change behaviour in the long run, as the
trial ended in December 2010. However, this result may indicate that there are changes
in the behaviour through the end of the trial. Future work in this direction are envisaged
in order to understand better the reaction of the participants between the short and the
medium term.
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Table 6: Estimation Results - Education, peak hours, (KWh/day)
A B C D Treat
Period
Treat
Group
Edu
Dummy
Int.
Edu
Tar-
iff
Weekday
Dumm.
BH Sunsh. App. Elec.
Heat.
17-
1730
Bimonthly-0.044 -0.070 -0.024 -0.037 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.017 -0.060 -0.050 -0.075 S(-) NS NS NS S NS S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.057 -0.032 -0.036 -0.063 S(-) NS NS NS S NS S(-) S(+) S(+)
1730-
18
Bimonthly-0.058 -0.081 -0.039 -0.056 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.039 -0.063 -0.067 -0.099 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.077 -0.084 -0.066 -0.071 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
18-
1830
Bimonthly-0.050 -0.080 -0.036 -0.075 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.045 -0.070 -0.073 -0.118 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.074 -0.064 -0.080 -0.095 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
1830-
19
Bimonthly-0.038 -0.089 -0.032 -0.077 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.052 -0.078 -0.072 -0.111 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.074 -0.056 -0.074 -0.107 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
19-
1930
Bimonthly-0.008 -0.048 -0.007 -0.018 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Monthly -0.022 -0.036 -0.031 -0.028 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
IHD -0.040 -0.035 -0.029 -0.047 S(-) NS NS NS S S(+) S(-) S(+) S(+)
Significant coefficients are in bold. NS=not significant, S=significant, S(-) is significant and negative, S(+) is significant and positive
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5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the half-hourly behaviour of consumers exposed to a change in the electricity
tariff and to billing information. In particular, this work uses the data collected during the trial
made by the Irish Electricity and Gas Regulation Authority (CER) between 2009 and 2010 to
estimate the reaction to a tariff change by different groups of consumers. We focus on the change
in consumption during the three schemes applied in the trial (day, peak and night) and during the
half-hours immediately before and after these tariffs, focusing on the peak (from 5PM to 7PM) and
the night ( from 11PM to 7AM) hours. In this large-scale investigation of electricity consumption,
TOU pricing and financial feedback influenced the degree to which consumers reduced usage.
Consumption reduced during the peak period and then rebounded to pre-peak levels after the
period. For households with IHD, reduced consumption persisted for one half hour post-peak.
In the main, the data suggest that households reduced consumption rather than shifting con-
sumption from peak. In particular, one strategy that was expected was that households might
simply delay consumption until the end of the peak period. If such a pattern was common across
households, post-peak spikes in usages above baseline would have been recorded, but they were
not. It is possible that some consumption was shifted from peak, but that it was not done in a
coordinated fashion and thus was not visible in the overall numbers. There were some half-hourly
periods across the day that had significantly increased consumption, but these periods did not
conform to any obvious pattern of usage and these periods had relatively low baseline usage which
might have exaggerated these effects
Electricity usage can be construed as an intertemporal choice, in which immediate access to
heat, light and entertainment compete and often outweigh delayed financial costs. In line with
this interpretation, consumers provided with financial information at the greatest delay (the bi-
monthly billing group) were least sensitive to TOU tariffs. In addition, consumers provided with
immediate financial information through in-home displays showed the greatest reductions in usage
and reductions persisted beyond the end of the peak period.
Our work also analyses the response of highly educated households (i.e. with tertiary degree)
and compare them to the reaction of lower educated consumers. The results have some policy
implications. First, the education level of the head of the household has an effect on response
to tariffs or feedback for consumers in the monthly-bill and the IHD groups. The changes in
electricity consumption between the highly educated households and the average sample are not
huge, consequently, the introduction of TOU pricing would not be expected to unfairly target low
income or low education households. However, our findings show that better educated people are
keen to contract their consumption during peak hours more than less educated people, saving more
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money after the change in tariffs. Our results also show that both in the trial and in the control
period, highly educated people consume (on per-capita average) more electricity than less educated
people. Education may be considered a proxy of the income level, and the electricity consumption
for highly educated consumers may be associated with activities that may be either reduced or
postponed.
Second, the impact of IHD on electricity usage was such that even relatively minor increases in
peak pricing gave rise to considerable reductions in usage. Given that more punitive tariffs affect
behaviour through greater monetary costs on the customer, there is a potential for significant
monetary losses by households that fail to respond to peak pricing. By employing IHD, smaller
costs with smaller exposure to these negative side effects can have greater impact on consumer
behaviour.
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